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A LOSS FOR LAROUCHE DOESN'T MEAN A VICTORY
FOR REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
Without a doubt, the First Amendment's freedom of the press guar-
antee' is far from absolute.2 Perhaps the greatest limit on this freedom
has been in the area of tort liability for defamation-libel and slander.3
In this context, Justice White asserted: "[it is] the prevailing view ...
that the press is not free to publish with impunity everything and any-
thing it desires ... "'
The balance between the freedom of the press protections and defa-
mation liability has been continually fine tuned,5 but one area that re-
mains far from settled concerns a reporter's privilege. When the
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment neither protects the press
from revealing the identity of informants in grand jury investigations6
nor, from an inquiry into the state of mind of those who edit, produce or
publish in a defamation suit,7 it appeared that the Court denied the possi-
bility of a reporter's privilege under the First Amendment. However, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in LaRouche v. National Broadcasting
Company ("LaRouche ")8 recognized a First Amendment reporter's priv-
ilege, sufficient to deny Lyndon LaRouche the opportunity to depose the
National Broadcasting Company's ("NBC") sources. LaRouche is but
1. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press .. " U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
2. C. DUCAT AND H. CHASE, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1239-49 (1983).
3. There are some who have argued that freedom of the press has not been limited by
defamation liability. This argument was presented in Near v. State of Minnesota, 51 S. Ct.
625, 631 (1930). In Near, the Supreme Court reviewed the historical meaning of freedom of
the press "that liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the Federal Consti-
tution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or
censorship." Thus, since libel imposes liability for what has already been said, and not for
what can be prevented from being said, it does not impinge upon the freedom of the press
rights protected by the First Amendment. In response, it has been argued that while holding
the media liable for their defamatory remarks may not be a direct restraint upon the press,
nevertheless, the litigation indirectly limits the freedom of the press by causing a "chilling
effect" on the media's pursuit to report openly all of the information it has gathered.
4. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972).
5. "This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define the proper accommodation
between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First
Amendment." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325 (1974).
6. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.
7. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
8. LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1986).
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one case among many9 that has put the issue of a reporter's privilege in
an arena of uncertainty following what appeared to be a definitive answer
by the Supreme Court.
PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFUL LYNDON LAROUCHE FIGHTS BACK
By 1984, Lyndon LaRouche' ° had the experience of three past pres-
idential elections behind him.'I That year, he launched his most agres-
sive campaign for the presidency. Spending millions in advertising and
with his own organization, the National Democratic Policy Committee,
behind him, LaRouche made another unsuccessful bid for the Demo-
cratic Party nomination. As an independent candidate, he went on to
receive less than one per cent of the popular vote and no electoral votes.
But his campaign was not without controversy. 2
In the heat of the campaign, NBC aired two stories about
LaRouche, claiming that LaRouche said that Jews are responsible for all
the evils in the world, that any serious investigation of the LaRouche
organization by the Internal Revenue Service would lead to criminal in-
dictment, and that LaRouche once proposed the assassination of Presi-
dent Carter and several of his aides. The stories appeared on the January
30, 1984 broadcast of the "Nightly News" and the "First Camera"
broadcast of March 4, 1984.13
As a result of the broadcasts, LaRouche filed a complaint against
NBC and others for defamation. NBC filed a counterclaim for interfer-
ence with its business relations.14 Early in discovery, LaRouche moved
9. See Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Criden,
633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583
(Ist Cir. 1980); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975).
10. The vast political career of LaRouche has covered the entire ideological spectrum,
from his participation in the Trotskyite Socialist Workers Party to his self-proclaimed hatred
of communism. He has been labeled a neo-fascist by some groups and a KGB agent by others.
Among his beliefs, LaRouche has claimed that world events were manipulated through con-
spiracies, led chiefly by the British and Zionists and that President Reagan was drugged. Los
Angeles Times, May 27, 1984, at 16, coll.
11. Id.
12. In 1986, LaRouche was indicted on 117 counts of fraud and obstruction of justice.
The fraud charges arose from allegations that LaRouche followers used the credit card num-
bers of those who had purchased literature or had made donations to his campaign to make a
million dollars in false charges. Huntley, Lowering the Boom on LaRouche, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, October 20, 1986, at 8.
13. LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1136-37.
14. Id. at 1137. NBC alleged and the district court held that LaRouche had interfered
with NBC's business relations when someone affiliated with his office, purporting to be from
New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's office, called NBC to inform the broadcaster
that a scheduled interview would be cancelled. Then, while claiming to be from NBC, some-
one called Senator Moynihan's office to cancel the same interview. Although the interview
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to compel NBC's reporters to disclose the confidential sources of the in-
formation. The district court affirmed the Magistrate's ruling to deny the
motion on the grounds that LaRouche had not exhausted other possible
sources of this information. 5 The district court denied the renewed mo-
tion for the same reason.' 6 The court also denied LaRouche's pretrial
motion to preclude NBC from relying on information from confidential
sources at trial.' 7 NBC prevailed on the defamation claim and on its
counterclaim.
On appeal, LaRouche charged error in the district court's refusal to
compel NBC to disclose confidential sources and in its refusal to pre-
clude NBC from relying on those sources at trial.'" Applying the balanc-
ing test developed from Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Branzburg v.
Hayes,' I9 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
denial of LaRouche's motion to compel the disclosure of the identities.2 °
The court based its conclusion on its determination that LaRouche had
failed to exhaust alternative sources of the information.2' The court held
that the district court was within its discretion to deny the motion.22
Is THERE A REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE?
A. Privileges Under The Rules of Evidence
Perhaps the most fundamental maxim of evidence is that:
[T]he public has a right to every man's evidence. When we
eventually took place, a good deal of confusion resulted from the calls. The court found that
this confusion was a sufficient injury to award damages based on interference with business
relations.
15. Id. The court found that LaRouche failed to depose some obvious sources of informa-
tion, including former LaRouche associate, Larry Cooper, the revealed source of the Carter
assassination story and Gordon Novel, a confidential source.
16. Id. There is some question as to whether the district court took into consideration the
fact that a LaRouche publication, New Solidarity, claimed that LaRouche already knew the
identity of the informants.
17. Id. at 1137.
18. Id. at 1138-39. LaRouche also claimed that the district court erred in not granting his
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, claiming that the evidence was legally
insufficient to find intentional interference with NBC's business relations and for failing to
declare a mistrial in view of potential outside influence on the jury. One of the defendants, the
Anti-Defamation League, appealed the district court's denial of sanctions against LaRouche
and his lawyers pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
19. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10.
20. LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139.
21. The court applied the three-part test found in Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621
F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980): (1) whether the information is relevant, (2) whether the information
can be obtained by alternative means and (3) whether there is a compelling interest in the
information. LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139.
22. LaRouche. 780 F.2d at 1139.
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come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with
the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give
what testimony one is capable of giving and that any exemp-
tions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many
derogations from a positive general rule.
23
In light of this tenet, Justice Frankfurter wrote: "As the underlying
aim of judicial inquiry is ascertainable truth, everything rationally related
to ascertaining the truth is presumptively admissible." 24 This broad lan-
guage suggests that a criminal defendant or a civil litigant should be per-
mitted to produce whatever evidence is necessary to elicit the truth.25
But despite the ultimate goal of ascertaining the truth, there are recog-
nized limits as to what is admissible and what is discoverable. In addi-
tion to limits imposed by the common law and promulgated rules of
evidence, state and federal courts are also restricted by the Constitution.
Among the limits on admissible evidence and discovery are what
have come to be known as privileges. A privilege results from a judicial
pre-determination that the interest in protecting the communication out-
weighs any detrimental effect that it may have on any opposing interest
and ascertaining the truth.26 A reporter's privilege, such as that claimed
by NBC, protects members of the press from being compelled to disclose
the identity of sources in court proceedings. 27 Proponents of this privi-
lege claim that the authorization for such an evidentiary exemption is
grounded in the First Amendment's freedom of the press guarantee. 28
Although the court in LaRouche concluded that NBC could claim a
First Amendment reporter's privilege, whether the reporter's privilege is
actually grounded in the First Amendment, if it exists at all, is at best
debatable. 29 However, there can be no doubt that such a privilege is in-
consistent with the principle that all relevant evidence is admissible.
23. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (1961).
24. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960).
25. In fact, in promulgating the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the importance of ascertaining the truth by providing for several rules governing pre-
trial discovery, including Rule 37, which provides for sanctions against parties and deponents
who fail to comply with an order compelling discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
26. See E.CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 170-72 (1984).
27. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 680.
28. Id.
29. The Branzburg decision exemplifies this debate. While the majority in that case held
that there was no First Amendment reporter's privilege, the plurality opinion of Justice Powell
in fact contends that under certain circumstances, there is such a privilege. See Comment,
Source Disclosure in Public Figure Defamation Actions: Towards Greater First Amendment
Protection, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 623 (1982).
[Vol. 8
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B. Constitutionality of the Reporter's Privilege
The landmark Supreme Court decision concerning the reporter's
privilege was handed down in the case of Branzburg v. Hayes.3 ° In
Branzburg, the Supreme Court rejected the reporter's claim of privilege
and held that he had an obligation to respond to a grand jury subpoena
and answer questions relevant to a criminal investigation.3"
Branzburg, a staff reporter for a Kentucky daily newspaper, refused
to identify to a grand jury the individuals about whom he had written
two stories on converting marijuana into hashish.32 A state trial court
judge ordered Branzburg to answer the grand jury's questions and re-
jected his contention that either the Kentucky reporters' privilege stat-
ute,33 the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or,
Sections 1, 2 and 8 of the Kentucky Constitution protected him from
disclosing his sources.34 Branzburg petitioned to the Kentucky Court of
Appeals; however, his petition was denied.35 In a second case involving
Branzburg, under a similar factual setting, the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals again denied Branzburg's petition.36
The United States Supreme Court granted Branzburg a writ of certi-
orari.37 The issue before the Court was whether the First Amendment
gave a reporter immunity from answering questions before a grand jury
30. Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 668-70.
33. The statute provides: "No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceed-
ing or trial before any court ... the source of any information procured or obtained by him,
and published in a newspaper or by radio or television broadcasting station. Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 421.100 (1962).
34. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668.
35. Id.
36. The court of appeals concluded that it was the "generally recognized rule that the
sources of information of a newspaper reporter are not privileged under the First Amend-
ment." Id. at 670.
37. Id. at 671. The court also granted certiorari to two companion cases: In re Pappas,
358 Mass. 604 (1971) and United States v. Caldwell, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970). Pappas
was a television newsman/photographer who refused to answer the grand jury's questions
regarding the identities of members of the Black Panther organization, which he had infiltrated
while covering a report on civil disorders. Pappas appealed the Massachusetts Supreme
Court's decision against any reporter's privilege. In re Pappas, 358 Mass. at 612. In Caldwell,
the United States petitioned for certiorari following the court of appeals reversal of the district
court's contempt order. The district court found Caldwell in contempt for refusing to appear
before a grand jury to submit testimony and offer notes and tape recorded interviews given to
him for publication by officers and spokesmen of the Black Panther organization. The court of
appeals held that the First Amendment provided a qualified testimonial privilege to newsmen.
Absent compelling reasons for requiring his testimony, he was privileged to withhold it. Cald-
well, 434 F.2d at 1089.
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concerning the identities of sources. Branzburg claimed that if his
sources' identities were disclosed, they and the confidential sources of
other reporters would be deterred from furnishing publishable informa-
tion, diminishing the free flow of information as protected by the First
Amendment.38 Furthermore, he claimed that the First Amendment re-
porter's privilege should be overridden only in the face of a compelling
need for the information, which was not present here.39
The Court, however, did not share Branzburg's sentiments. Writing
for the four member majority, Justice White gave several reasons for de-
nying a First Amendment reporter's privilege. First, he stated that in
this case there was no intrusion upon speech or assembly, no prior re-
straint or restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or
implied command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold.'
He added, since citizens generally are not constitutionally immune from
grand jury subpoenas, neither are reporters and other members of the
media. Justice White concluded that this was the prevailing view, consis-
tent with the great weight of authority.4' In dicta, Justice White added
that a news reporter is also not exempt from disclosing confidential infor-
mation to a subpoena issued in a civil suit.42 Such a claim, he added, has
been almost uniformly rejected since Garland v. Torre. 3
Justice White also rejected Branzburg's claim that without such a
privilege the flow of information from sources would be impaired." In
doing so, he first recognized that the evidence failed to demonstrate that
the flow of news would be constricted.45 Citing surveys of reporters'
opinions as to "chilling effects," he concluded that an inhibitive effect is
merely speculative. 46 He also recognized several reasons why such infor-
38. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 679-80.
39. Id. at 680.
40. Id. at 681.
41. Id. at 685.
42. Justice White cited Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958) for the proposition
that news gatherers are not exempted from disclosure of confidential sources pursuant to a
subpoena issued in a civil suit. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 686. In Garland, the famous actress
Judy Garland brought an action against CBS for breach of contract and defamatory state-
ments allegedly made concerning her by a network executive to a newspaper reporter. The
district court held the columnist in contempt for failing to answer questions concerning the
identity of the network executive. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the First
Amendment of the Constitution conferred no right on columnists to refuse to answer questions
concerning the identity of sources, and that there was no evidentiary privilege. Garland. 259
F.2d at 551.
43. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 686-87.
44. Id. at 693.
45. Id. at 693-94.
46. Id. at 694. Justice White added that even if there was an actual "chilling effect," such
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mation would not dry up even with knowledge that identities might be
revealed.47 Justice White concluded that "[flrom the beginning of our
country the press has operated without constitutional protection for
press informants, and the press has flourished. The existing constitu-
tional rules have not been a serious obstacle to either the development or
retention of confidential news sources by the press."4
Finally, Justice White rejected any notion that the courts should be
involved in balancing "compelling" governmental interests against a re-
porter's privilege.49 To do so "would be making a value judgment that a
legislature had declined to make . . . . The task of judges, like other
officials outside the legislative branch, is not to make the law but to up-
hold it in accordance with their oaths.",
50
Justice Powell provided the fifth vote in favor of denying Branzburg
a reporter's privilege; however, he authored a separate opinion. 1 Unlike
the four vote majority, Justice Powell suggested that "the asserted claim
of privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper bal-
ance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to
give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct."5 2 This opin-
ion has often been cited, as in the case of LaRouche,5" to support grant-
ing a reporter's privilege through balancing the interests.
The absence of a clear majority in Branzburg has caused divergent
applications of the decision among lower courts; some courts have fol-
lowed the White opinion, while others have taken heed to Powell's bal-
ancing approach.54 However, any problem with uniform application of
the Branzburg decision should have been resolved following the Court's
an effect could never be quantified since the view's of informants/sources could never be can-
vassed because of their secretive nature. Id.
47. Justice White wrote: "The reporter may never be called and if he objects to testifying,
the prosecution may not insist. Also, the relationship of many informants to the press is a
symbiotic one which is unlikely to be greatly inhibited by the threat of subpoena .. " Id. at
694-95.
48. Id. at 698-99.
49. Id. at 705-06.
50. Id. at 706.
51. Id. at 709.
52. Id. at 710.
53. LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139.
54. Three courts of appeals have accepted the Branzburg majority approach: Baker v. F &
F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th Cir.
1987); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 484 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972). Five of the courts have followed
Justice Powell's balancing approach: Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633
F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican
Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975);
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977). The Seventh and the Eleventh
Circuits have not taken a clear position as of yet.
1988]
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6-3 rejection of a reporter's privilege in Herbert v. Lando in 1979." 5
In that case, Anthony Herbert, a retired Army officer, brought an
action against the Columbia Broadcasting System ("CBS") for defama-
tion, alleging that a "60 Minutes" program had falsely and maliciously
portrayed him as a liar and a person who had made war-crimes charges
against his superior officers to explain his relief from command.16 Her-
bert sought and obtained an order compelling Barry Lando, the producer
and editor of the segment, to answer a variety of questions. The district
court rejected Lando's contention that the First Amendment protected
against inquiry into the state of mind of those who edit, produce, or pub-
lish or into the editorial processes.57 In so ruling, the court found that
these questions were relevant to disclose whether Lando had any reason
to doubt the veracity of his sources.5" A divided Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that "the First Amendment lent sufficient pro-
tection to the editorial processes to protect Lando from inquiry about his
thoughts, opinions, and conclusions ....
On appeal to the Supreme Court, as in Branzburg, Justice White
delivered the majority opinion. In rejecting the court of appeals' finding,
he concluded that "there is no privilege under the First Amendment...
barring the plaintiff from inquiring into the editorial processes of those
responsible for the publication where the inquiry will produce evidence
material to the proof of a critical element of the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion."' In reaching that conclusion, Justice White reasoned that since
the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to abolish liability for
defamation, such liability was not to be considered an abridgment of the
right to freedom of speech or freedom of the press.6" More importantly,
he concluded that since proving the "malicious" state of mind is essential
in defamation lawsuits, a First Amendment reporter's privilege protect-
ing the media's thought processes would in fact preclude the plaintiff
from carrying his heavy burden of proof and therefore, eliminate defama-
tion liability against the media.62 Finally, Justice White reiterated that it
was important not to exempt evidence "[so] that more accurate results
55. Herbert, 441 U.S. 153.
56. Id. at 156-57. The source of the complaint included an article published in the Atlan-
tic Monthly by Barry Lando, who produced and edited the "60 Minutes" segment.
57. Id. at 157.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 158.
60. Id. at 153.
61. Id. at 158-59.
62. Id. at 160. Justice White wrote: "Inevitably, unless liability is to be completely fore-




will be obtained by placing all, rather than part, of the evidence before
the decisionmaker.,
63
To summarize, the Supreme Court has twice rejected a First
Amendment reporter's privilege. Although Branzburg was a non-major-
ity decision in a criminal context, the Herbert decision had a clear major-
ity which rejected a reporter's privilege in a civil context. Branzburg and
Herbert could be limited to the particular facts of each case; however, the
underlying principles that such a privilege is not within the historical
meaning of freedom of the press, that granting a privilege would, in ef-
fect, impair defamation liability, that "chilling effects" are at best illu-
sory' and that a reporter's privilege would undermine the ability of
courts to ascertain the truth, are general enough to apply to a variety of
factual situations.
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPLY THE
CORRECT LAW IN LAROUCHE
Although the Supreme Court denied a First Amendment reporter's
privilege, it does not necessarily follow that a lower court can never find
a reporter's privilege. As Justice White recognized in Branzburg, the
state legislators are free to fashion their own standards as to such a privi-
lege. 65 Not only can the state courts decide on the basis of state legisla-
tion and common law but, in diversity cases, federal courts as well do not
have to follow the high court's decisions. Under Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the availability of an evidentiary privilege in a diver-
sity case is governed by the law of the forum state.66 Thus, since
LaRouche was a diversity case in federal district court in Virginia, Vir-
ginia law should have been applied.67 However, neither the district court
63. Id. at 172-73.
64. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). "Allegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an ade-
quate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific harm." Id.
at 13-14.
65. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706.
66. Rule 501 provides: "However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege
of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law." Fed. R. Evid. 501. See Reese and Leiwant, Testimonial Privileges
and Conflict of Laws, 86 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85 (1977).
67. Concerning a reporter's privilege, instead of a reporter's privilege statute or shield law,
the Virginia Supreme Court has "tailored the privilege to the limits protected by the First
Amendment." Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 724 (5th Cir. 1980). The
Virginia Supreme Court in Brown v. Commonwealth followed the majority decision in
Branzburg and thus, this was the applicable law. Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429,
431 (1974).
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nor the court of appeals applied Virginia law.6" Instead, the court of
appeals merely stated that a motion to compel discovery is within the
sound discretion of the district court.69
NBC's REPORTER PRIVILEGE CONFLICTS WITH
PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE
In LaRouche, not only did NBC's reporter privilege deny the public
its right to "every man's evidence," but the truth as to the validity of
LaRouche's claim was forever precluded from the jury's consideration;
without the identities LaRouche could not prove actual malice by clear
and convincing evidence.7 °
The LaRouche decision raises an additional evidentiary shortcoming
of a reporter's privilege. Specifically, the court may allow a media de-
fendant in a defamation suit to use the privilege not only as a shield but
as a sword as well.71 That is, the court may allow a reporter to claim a
testimonial privilege as a shield, to protect confidential information (the
source's identity), while disclosing parts of the protected information to
bolster his defense. This results in the defendant producing whatever
exculpatory testimony he desires, while leaving the plaintiff powerless to
attack his honesty regarding that testimony.
In the context of LaRouche, NBC used its privilege as both a sword
and a shield; the district court allowed NBC to allow the reporter to
testify as to information provided by sources, while claiming a privilege
to shield against LaRouche's attempt to discover the identity of the
sources and impeach the reporter's testimony.
However, the use of a testimonial privilege as both a sword and a
shield should be disallowed because it is unfair for the court to allow a
68. LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139. The court of appeals cited Tiedman v. American Pig-
ment Corp., 253 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1958) for the proposition that a motion to compel discov-
ery is addressed to the sound discretion of the district court, even when the object of the
discovery is a journalist's confidential source. However, the court failed to recognize that such
discretion exists only if the court follows Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburg.
Justice Powell proposed that courts should apply a balancing of interests approach, such as in
Garland. This argument must fail, however, because the majority's opinion in Branzburg ex-
pressly denied court discretion, stating that the courts should not get involved in weighing the
interests. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 705-06.
69. LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139.
70. In a public figure defamation suit, the plaintiff must prove actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence. That is, he must show that the defendant acted with knowledge that the
information was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or not. New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).




witness to "have it both ways." 2 It is especially unfair in a defamation
action where the plaintiff carries a heavy burden.73 In LaRouche, it was
unfair to allow NBC to produce whatever damaging testimony from the
reporter it desired, while depriving LaRouche the opportunity to chal-
lenge the veracity of the testimony; without the identity of the sources he
could only produce witnesses to deny that he had ever made such state-
ments. To be fair, if the court was going to uphold the privilege, it
should have at least precluded NBC from introducing the privileged
information.
NBC's REPORTER PRIVILEGE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
In addition to conflicting with principles of evidence, NBC's re-
porter privilege does not fall within the protections of the First Amend-
ment. NBC's argument that the power to protect the identity of
informants is an inherent right within the conception of a free press, as
provided for in the First Amendment, was most clearly rejected in Gar-
land v. Torre."4 In Garland, CBS asserted that compelling reporters to
disclose the confidential sources would encroach upon the First Amend-
ment right because "it would impose an important practical restraint on
the flow of news from news sources to news media and would thus dimin-
ish pro tanto the flow of news to the public."75 But the court rejected
CBS' "practical restraint" argument and allowed Garland to compel the
disclosure of the sources' identities. 6
In rejecting CBS' argument, the court stated that it has long been
recognized that freedom of the press connotes a meaning entirely differ-
ent from that which CBS asserted.77 Citing Near,7" the court stated that
freedom of the press within the historical meaning of the First Amend-
ment meant primarily freedom from prior governmental restraints and
not de facto restraints or restraints that result as a practical matter.79
Under such an interpretation, for example, the argument that the press
72. Dowd v. Calabrese, 577 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1983).
73. See supra note 70.
74. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 547-48 (2d Cir. 1958).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 548.
78. Near, 283 U.S. 697.
79. The Court in Near quoted Blackstone:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this con-
sists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from
censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undisputed right
to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the
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would be restrained by a "chilling effect," resulting from requiring the
reporter to disclose the identities of his sources, would fail. Not only
would it fail because such a "chilling effect" (restraint) is illusive, as Jus-
tice White noted in Branzburg,s° but also because the government im-
posed no restriction upon what can or cannot be published. Thus, the
First Amendment would not be violated by denying a reporter's privilege
based on an alleged "chilling effect."
In the context of LaRouche, no direct prior restraint was involved;
no one prevented NBC from broadcasting what they wanted to broad-
cast. Rather, the suit concerned the impact of what was broadcasted.
Since there was no danger of a prior restraint, the court's finding of a
First Amendment privilege was inappropriate.
Beyond the historical meaning of freedom of the press, if the idea
that the First Amendment protects also against indirect restraints is car-
ried to its logical extreme, no interference whatsoever would be permissi-
ble, for it could affect the free flow of information to the public. For
example, a tax on newsprint could affect the flow of information because
there would be less of the newspaper's resources left for information
gathering."' Additionally, the press would be immune from all civil lia-
bility and criminal prosecution because any such litigation would restrain
the free flow of information by reducing the resources available for infor-
mation gathering. However, this notion was clearly rejected in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan when the Supreme Court stated that the press is not
free to publish with impunity everything and anything it desires.82 Thus,
NBC's claim that the reporter's privilege falls within the First Amend-
ment's freedom of the press guarantee ignores the realities of history and
freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he
must take the consequence of his own temerity.
The Court also quoted Madison: "This security of the freedom of the press requires that it
should be exempt not only from previous restraint by the Executive, as in Great Britain, but
from legislative restraint also." Near, 283 U.S. at 713-14.
80. Recall that Justice White in Branzburg, considered possible chilling effects in the con-
text of a fear of criminal prosecution. Justice White concluded that such effects were at best
speculative and that there was no significant impact on the press. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693-
99. It seems that in LaRouche as well as most civil suits, the sources would not face any
criminal sanctions and that there would be a lesser chance of a chill factor.
81. The notion that the press was immune from general forms of taxation was dispelled in
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). Likewise, the media is not exempt
from the requirements of the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, nor
the Sherman Act. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103,
132-33 (1937).
82. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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modern conceptions of the press as being far from free of all governmen-
tal interference.
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH A BALANCING APPROACH
But even if Justice Powell's suggestion that a reporter's privilege is
within the protections of the First Amendment when the interest in free-
dom of the press outweighs the duty to submit all relevent evidence, such
a balancing approach should be rejected because of the practical
problems created in applying the tests: 1) the amount of judicial discre-
tion in balancing the opposing factors allows the courts to dispose of the
plaintiff's claim without a valid reason, 2) the plaintiff's ability to re-
cover is seriously impaired, and 3) the press would be at liberty to make
injurious remarks without fear of liability.
A. Balancing Test Equals Excess Discretion
To demonstrate the potential for judicial abuse balancing permits,
look no farther than LaRouche. In applying a balancing test, both the
trial and appellate courts abused their discretion by denying LaRouche's
motion on the grounds that he failed to exhaust all reasonable alternative
means of obtaining the sought after information. s3 Not only did the
courts apply the wrong criteria for "exhaustion," but both failed to ac-
knowledge the efforts LaRouche made in deposing possible sources. Be-
yond that, even if it is conceded that LaRouche did not exhaust all
reasonable alternative sources of the information, the court of appeals
abused its discretion by failing to perform a complete balancing test. If a
complete balancing had indeed been performed, it could not have
reached the same conclusion.
The court's first abuse arose from its application of the "exhaustion"
requirement. As the court found in Garland v. Torre, exhaustion re-
quires only "reasonable efforts" under the circumstances and not com-
plete exhaustion. 4 In Garland, the court concluded that although the
plaintiff deposed only three possible sources of the statements in ques-
tion, the plaintiff's efforts were reasonable and thus, satisfied the exhaus-
tion requirement.8 5 The court's conclusion appeared to rest on the fact
that the plaintiff deposed those possible sources identified by CBS' secre-
tary, but that all three denied making the statements.
8 6
83. LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139.
84. Garland, 259 F.2d at 551.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 547.
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In LaRouche, instead of focusing on whether LaRouche had ex-
pended reasonable efforts, the court of appeals merely stated that
LaRouche failed to depose the two actual sources and that he had failed
to exhaust all his non-party depositions.87 The court appeared to disre-
gard the fact that LaRouche took eleven depositions, including five non-
party depositions, which was the limit imposed by the court. 8
Moreover, under the circumstances, his efforts should have been
deemed more than reasonable. First, NBC interviewed over one hundred
individuals for the broadcasts, a number far greater than a party should
be expected to depose in a defamation action. Secondly, unlike Garland,
LaRouche did not have the benefit of inside information as to possible
sources. Thus, any depositions LaRouche took involved a substantial
amount of guesswork. It seems unreasonable that a court should expect
a party to expend vast amounts of resources, with no more than a slim
chance of success.89
In addition to abusing its discretion by applying an overly strict "ex-
haustion" standard, the LaRouche court also abused its discretion by
failing to counterbalance the exhaustion test against the relevancy of the
information and the compelling interest in the information, the other
tests in the three part balancing. With respect to relevancy, the heavy
burden on a plaintiff in a public figure libel case to prove actual malice9"
"[makes] discovery of confidential sources critical to any hope of carry-
ing that burden." 9' Thus, the identity of the sources is more than rele-
vant, it goes to the "heart of the claim." 92
LaRouche exemplifies the relevancy of the source's identity. With-
out the source's identity, LaRouche was precluded from proving that
NBC was reckless. 93 For example, with the source's identity, LaRouche
could have called the source of the "IRS allegations" to the stand to
show that that person was in no position to know the finances of the
LaRouche organization. From there, he could have proven that NBC
was aware of that fact, but that they aired the allegations anyway. With-
87. LaRouche, 780 F.2d at 1139.
88. Brief for Appellant at 7, LaRouche v. NBC, 55 USLW 3232 (U.S. May 20, 1986) (No.
85-1914).
89. In Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court concluded that litigants
should not "be made to carry wide-ranging and onerous discovery burdens where the path is
[so] ill-lighted .... Id. at 639.
90. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 254.
91. Carey, 492 F.2d at 634.
92. Garland, 259 F.2d at 550.
93. In a public figure defamation case, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant acted with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was true or not. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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out the identities, LaRouche could only personally refute the allegation,
far short of what he needed to prove NBC's malice by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. Thus, because the identity went to the "heart of the claim"
the relevancy test was clearly in LaRouche's favor.
Closely related to relevancy is the compelling interest test. Cer-
tainly a plaintiff, such as LaRouche, has a compelling interest in the in-
formation because his claim depends upon it. But even more compelling
are the interests of the public and the government in seeing that the
courts properly administer justice. It can hardly be said that the court
has administered justice when a plaintiff is, in effect, deprived of the op-
portunity to prove his case. Courts are expected to expedite and not pre-
clude plaintiffs from recovering for injuries suffered.
Thus, it seems that the information was highly relevant and that
there was a compelling interest in the identity, but that the courts in
LaRouche abused their discretion by disregarding these countervailing
factors. The reasons for this oversight are left for speculation,94 but the
fact remains that when a court has the discretion to balance the interests,
the potential for judicial abuse is great while the plaintiff's valid claim
can be nullified at the court's whim. For these reasons, the courts in
LaRouche should have followed the majority opinion in Branzburg and
Lando by rejecting the balancing approach.
B. Balancing Impairs a Plaintiff's Claim
Secondly, the balancing approach makes it practically impossible for
a plaintiff with a defamation claim to prevail against members of the
press. For example, in order for LaRouche to prove his case, he had to
prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence-that NBC broad-
casted with knowledge that the information was false or with reckless
disregard for whether it was true or not. However, since the reporter
was able to protect the identity of her sources, LaRouche had no means
to attack the reliability of the information. Only with the identities of the
sources could he have attacked the veracity of the reporter's testimony
and proven actual malice by showing that NBC acted with reckless disre-
gard of whether the information was true or not. By granting the re-
porter's privilege the court of appeals, in effect, foreclosed any
opportunity for LaRouche to prevail.
Thus, precluding the discovery of the identities of crucial sources
has the effect of denying the plaintiff the opportunity to prove that the
94. It is this author's opinion that the courts were disinclined to favor LaRouche because
he came into court with "unclean hands"--he had interfered with NBC's business relations.
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reporter acted with actual malice and was not merely reporting the news.
Unless liability is to be completely foreclosed, the identity of informants
of the alleged defamer must be open to examination.
C. Balancing Opens the Door for Careless Reporting
On a broader scale, the final practical effect of finding a reporter's
privilege could be to remove any deterrent effect the threat of potential
liability will have upon members of the press who go beyond reporting of
the facts.9" Without the threat of defamation liability, there will be little
incentive for members of the media to report only information given by
reliable informants. Since they will never be held accountable, the incen-
tive may be to publish the incredible rather than the truth.
CONCLUSION
What is left after LaRouche varies little from the confusion prior to
LaRouche-two divergent approaches to the reporter's privilege problem
and no consistency among the courts. A majority of the circuit courts
apply the Powell balancing approach found in his concurring opinion in
Branzburg.96 But with the Herbert decision, it seems that the Supreme
Court is bent on rejecting the idea of any reporter's privilege. However,
the Court, in denying LaRouche's petition for certiorari, did not see
LaRouche as the case to unify the lower courts. Nevertheless, if plaintiffs
in defamation actions are not to be precluded from proving their cases,
and if the courts are truly concerned with following constitutional guide-
lines, the reporter's privilege should be rejected.
Michael Spector
95. In Herbert, Justice White added that liability was an important deterrent which dis-
couraged the media from publishing material threatening injury to individual reputation.
Without disclosure, there would be no liability and the media would not be deterred. Herbert,
441 U.S. at 171.
96. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10.
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